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1435 
FACTIONS FOR THE REST OF US 
JOHN D. INAZU
 
I am grateful to Washington University School of Law for hosting the 
recent discussion on my book Liberty‟s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of 
Assembly.
1
 I had three objectives in writing Liberty‟s Refuge: one 
diagnostic, one historical, and one normative. The diagnosis highlights 
difficulties with the current doctrine of intimate and expressive 
association.
2
 The history excavates the prominent role that the right of 
assembly occupies in our constitutional and popular past.
3
 The normative 
theory contends that we ought to protect dissenting private groups even at 
the cost of stability and uniformity.
4
 The introductory remarks by 
Professor Magarian and the three essays from Professors Bhagwat, 
Vischer, and Appleton address these objectives through generous 
engagement and thoughtful critique.
5
 In the limited space of this response, 
I focus on six themes prompted by the commentators: expression, 
violence, relationality, power, funding, and commerciality. 
I. EXPRESSION 
I am indebted to Professor Bhagwat for emphasizing how the 
contemporary significance of assembly extends beyond illiberal groups 
that resist antidiscrimination law. As Professor Vischer notes in his 
comments, I situated the doctrinal analysis in Liberty‟s Refuge in the 
Supreme Court‘s recent case law, which meant that I gave the greatest 
 
 
  Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Washington University School of Law. 
Thanks to William Osberghaus and the editors and staff of the Washington University Law Review for 
their assistance in publishing this response. 
 1. The panel discussions on ―Engaging Liberty‟s Refuge‖ took place on March 2, 2012, and 
provided commentary on JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY‘S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF 
ASSEMBLY (2012). In addition to the authors of the three published responses, I thank Bernadette 
Meyler, Ian MacMullen, and Neil Richards for their thoughtful presentations and Deborah Dinner and 
Adrienne Davis for chairing the panels. Thanks also to Laura Rosenbury and Kent Syverud for making 
the event possible and to Beth Mott and Gail Boker for their assistance in organizing it. I owe the title 
of this essay to Ernie Young, who used the phrase to describe Liberty‟s Refuge when I first explained 
the book to him. 
 2. See INAZU, supra note 1, at 132–49. 
 3. See id. at 20–62.  
 4. See id. at 10–14, 153–73. 
 5. Gregory P. Magarian, Entering Liberty‘s Refuge (Some Assembly Required), 89 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1375 (2012); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Liberty‟s Refuge, or the Refuge of Scoundrels?: The Limits of 
the Right of Assembly, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1381 (2012); Robert K. Vischer, How Necessary is the 
Right of Assembly?, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1403 (2012); Susan Frelich Appleton, Liberty‟s Forgotten 
Refugees? Engendering Assembly, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1423 (2012). 
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attention to the clash between group autonomy and antidiscrimination 
law.
6
 While I continue to believe that exclusion is essential to expression 
and meaningful group autonomy, the principles of dissent and pluralism 
inherent in the right of assembly have far broader implications.
7
 Professor 
Bhagwat highlights these broader principles in two important ways: by 
critiquing my reliance on expression and by exploring the boundaries of 
peaceable assembly. I address the first issue in this part and the second in 
the following part. 
Professor Bhagwat argues that ―[a]ssembly should be protected not 
because it is expressive, but because it independently advances the goals 
of the First Amendment.‖8 He suggests that my ―focus on the expressive 
nature of group membership as the reason for its protection seems to 
abandon that insight, and once again make assembly the handmaiden of 
speech.‖9 While I hope I have not abandoned assembly to speech, 
Professor Bhagwat rightly notes that my framing of the issues in Liberty‟s 
Refuge risks that misconception. My emphasis on the inherent 
expressiveness of assembly was an effort to critique the current doctrinal 
framework that purports to distinguish between ―expressive‖ and 
―nonexpressive‖ associations. But the expressive potential of a group is 
not the reason that we value assembly. We value assembly because it 
facilitates dissent, self-governance, and the informal relationships that 
make politics possible.
10
 
 
 
 6. Vischer, supra note 5, at 1411 (―The scenarios through which Inazu works out the right of 
assembly tend to focus on the right to exclude, which is understandable given recent Supreme Court 
case law and the fact that the most pressing challenge to group autonomy is an expanding array of 
nondiscrimination laws.‖). For examples of recent cases that have focused on these issues, see, e.g., 
Christian Legal Soc‘y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 
640 (2000). See also N.Y. State Club Ass‘n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. of 
Rotary Int‘l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609 (1984). 
 7. In a forthcoming article, I highlight the ways in which groups express themselves through the 
activities of exclusion, embrace, expulsion, and establishment. See John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 
98 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).  
 8. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 1384. 
 9. Id. 
 10. INAZU, supra note 1, at 5 (―[T]he social vision of assembly does more than enable 
meaningful dissent. It provides a buffer between the individual and the state that facilitates a check 
against centralized power. It acknowledges the importance of groups to the shaping and forming of 
identity. And it facilitates a kind of flourishing that recognizes the good and the beautiful sometimes 
grow out of the unfamiliar and the mundane. Indeed, almost every important social movement in our 
nation‘s history began not as an organized political party but as an informal group that formed as much 
around ordinary social activity as extraordinary political activity.‖). Professor Bhagwat has expressed 
similar views. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 998 (2011) (―An 
association is a coming together of individuals for a common cause or based on common values or 
goals. Associations do not form spontaneously. Individuals seeking to form an association must be 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/8
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Conversely, I do not mean for my critiques of expressive association 
and its companion, intimate association, to obscure the legitimate 
functions advanced by the kinds of groups that the Court means to protect 
through these categories. Intimacy and expressiveness are themselves 
instrumentally valuable to creating and fostering dissent and self-
governance.
11
 But constitutional categories like intimate and expressive 
association will inevitably capture only a subset of the groups that they are 
designed to protect because functional analyses like intimacy or 
expressiveness lend themselves to arbitrary judgments. Why, for example, 
is a family intimate but a college fraternity is not?
12
 Or how are the Boy 
Scouts expressive but a motorcycle club is not?
13
 Rather than resort to 
these politicized judgments, we ought to ensure that we are protecting 
groups whose First Amendment value and significance is contested, which 
means that we will inevitably overprotect some groups that most of us do 
not think further any legitimate constitutional purpose. 
This posture of overprotection should sound familiar—it is precisely 
what we do with our free speech doctrine.
14
 Few people find redeeming 
social value in animal crush videos.
15
 But we protect expression of this 
 
 
able to communicate their views and values to each other, to identify their commonality. They must 
also be able to recruit strangers to join with them, on the basis of common values.‖). 
 11. Bhagwat, supra note 10, at 994; see also Inazu, supra note 7 (discussing how assembly 
facilitates the First Amendment values of identity formation, self-governance, and dissent).  
 12. Compare Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619–20 (1984) (noting that 
―[f]amily relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily 
few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, 
and beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects of one‘s life‖), with Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon 
Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 144–47 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a college 
fraternity, in which its members ―form deep attachments and commitments and share a community of 
thoughts, experiences, beliefs and distinctly personal aspects of their lives,‖ ―lack[ed] the 
characteristics that typify groups with strong claims to intimate association‖ because of the fraternity‘s 
―size, level of selectivity, purpose, and inclusion of non-members‖) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 13. Compare Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 649–50 (2000) (concluding that ―it 
seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a system of values engages in 
expressive activity‖), with Villegas v. City of Gilroy, 484 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir.) (concluding that 
the Top Hatters Motorcycle Club was not ―engaged in the type of expression that the First Amendment 
was designed to protect‖), vacated, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007), and Villegas v. City of Gilroy, 363 
F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (reasoning that because the Top Hatters ―were not engaged in 
expressive conduct and that no cognizable First Amendment right to ‗speech‘ arises in this case . . . no 
right of association arises here‖). 
 14. See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of 
the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 213 (―It must be recognized, of course, that a reason 
implicit in the breadth of the protection afforded speech is due to the judicial recognition of its own 
incapacity to make nice discriminations. It reflects a strategy that requires that speech be overprotected 
in order to assure that it is not underprotected.‖).  
 15. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1579 (2010) (striking down statutory restrictions 
on animal ―crush videos, which feature the torture and killing of helpless animals and are said to 
appeal to persons with a specific sexual fetish‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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nature because we worry that drawing different lines would harm the 
values underlying the right to free speech.
16
 We should have similar 
considerations in mind when it comes to the right of assembly.  
II. VIOLENCE 
One of the central claims of Liberty‟s Refuge is that we ought to extend 
epistemic deference and interpretive charity to the internal practices of 
private groups.
17
 I argue that we should adopt this posture to a much 
greater extent than current First Amendment doctrine permits. But I also 
identify a few limiting principles, including the textual limitation of 
peaceable assembly.
18
 Professor Bhagwat rightly asks how we determine 
when an assembly crosses the threshold from peaceability to violence. 
Like Professor Bhagwat, I lack a clear sense of where the peaceability 
line ought to be drawn. But I think he and I agree where it ought not be 
drawn: the Supreme Court‘s 2010 decision in Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project.
19
 That decision addressed a federal statute that prohibited 
―knowingly provid[ing] a foreign terrorist organization‖ with ―material 
support or resources.‖20 A group of U.S. citizens and associations 
challenged the statute‘s curtailment of their efforts to train members of 
two foreign groups ―to use humanitarian and international law to 
 
 
 16. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (―As a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect 
even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.‖); Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1585 (―The First Amendment‘s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of 
speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment 
itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the 
Government outweigh the costs.‖). But cf. JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE 
EMPIRE OF FORCE 41 (2006) (―We cannot ask of the Supreme Court . . . that it create a world in which 
only living speech exists, and in which advertising and propaganda, and other forms of trivializing and 
dehumanizing speech, have no place, but we can ask of our courts, as of ourselves, that they seek to 
imagine speech in a worthy way—to distinguish what has real value as speech from that which is 
destructive of the value of speech . . . .‖). 
 17. See, e.g., INAZU, supra note 1, at 2–3 (―Many group expressions are only intelligible against 
the lived practices that give them meaning. The rituals and liturgy of religious worship often embody 
deeper meaning than an outside observer would ascribe to them. The political significance of a 
women‘s pageant in the 1920s would be lost without knowing why these women gathered. And the 
creeds and songs recited by members of groups ranging from Alcoholics Anonymous to the Boy 
Scouts reflect a way of living that cannot be captured by a text or its utterance at any one event.‖). 
 18. The First Amendment protects ―the right of the people peaceably to assemble.‖ U.S. CONST. 
amend. I (emphasis added). For my discussion of the peaceability limitation, see INAZU, supra note 1, 
at 166–67. 
 19. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 1391 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 
(2010)). 
 20. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006). The statute defined ―material support or resources‖ to 
include, among other things, ―training,‖ ―expert advice or assistance,‖ ―personnel,‖ and ―service.‖ Id. 
§ 2339B(a)(1), g(4).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/8
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peacefully resolve disputes,‖ to ―engage in political advocacy,‖ and to 
teach members ―how to petition various representative bodies such as the 
United Nations for relief.‖21 The Court rejected the speech and association 
claims brought by these litigants.
22
 In fact, as Justice Breyer noted in 
dissent, the government suggested during oral argument that the material 
support provision ―prohibits a lawyer hired by a designated group from 
filing on behalf of that group an amicus brief before the United Nations or 
even before [the Supreme Court].‖23 That remarkable concession and the 
constitutional framework that enables it should not mark the boundaries of 
peaceable assembly.
24
  
But where then is the line? I am grateful for Professor Bhagwat‘s 
suggestion that Brandenburg‘s ―imminent violence‖ standard that governs 
free speech law ―may not translate easily into the area of assembly and 
association.‖25 Professor Bhagwat argues that ―there is something to the . . 
. assertion that groups are more dangerous than individuals when it comes 
to advocacy of violence.‖26 He asserts that the law recognizes this 
difference ―most obviously in the fact that it does not require violence to 
be imminent (or even likely) before prosecuting a conspiracy planning 
specific acts of violence, even though a whole-hearted importation of 
Brandenburg into the assembly/association area would seem to impose 
such a requirement.‖27  
These observations call to mind the Madisonian notion of faction, 
which, prior to its reinterpretation at the hands of mid-twentieth century 
pluralism, recognized that dissenting groups were disruptive risks to be 
tolerated out of necessity, not harmonious spokes in a ―balance wheel.‖28 
 
 
 21. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2716. 
 22. Id. at 2724–30 (denying free speech claim); id. at 2730–31 (denying association claim). 
 23. Id. at 2736 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 47–49, 53, Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08–1498)). 
 24. Cf. David Cole, The First Amendment‟s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV. 147, 149 (2012) (―If [Holder‘s] 
doctrinal developments are generally applicable, [the case] has dramatically expanded government 
authority to suppress political expression and association in the name of national security.‖). Cole 
suggests that courts interpreting Holder should limit its application to situations ―when the government 
is prohibiting only speech coordinated with or directed to foreign organizations that have been 
subjected to diplomatic sanctions for compelling national security reasons.‖ Id. at 176. 
 25. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 1389. Brandenburg‘s ―imminent violence‖ standard allows the 
government to ―forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation‖ when ―such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.‖ Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 26. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 1394. 
 27. Id. at 1394. 
 28. For a discussion of how the pluralist political theory of David Truman and Robert Dahl 
―misread Madison and decontextualized Tocqueville,‖ see INAZU, supra note 1, at 96–114. The 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Factions remind us that dissenting groups are a double-edged sword: the 
greater protections that we afford to them, the greater risk of instability we 
may introduce to the polity. In the context of Professor Bhagwat‘s concern 
about violent assemblies, there may well be differences between groups 
and individuals. But I am not sure that these differences doom a 
Brandenburg-like standard for assembly. Conspiracy law aims at an 
agreement to commit an illegal act, and it is generally the agreement itself 
(and some overt act) that triggers liability, not the imminence of the target 
offense. This focus leaves criminal conspiracy outside of Brandenburg 
even under a free speech analysis.
29
 Assemblies that are not criminal 
conspiracies may thus still be governable under a Brandenburg-like 
standard.
30
 
The potential disagreement between Professor Bhagwat and me about 
the precise contours of the differences between groups and individuals 
may also be a point at which he and I diverge on the level of political 
theory. Professor Bhagwat asserts that we ―need to have faith in the basic 
strength and unity of our society.‖31 I am not sure that I share that faith. I 
situated Liberty‟s Refuge within the spirit of the radical democratic theory 
of Sheldon Wolin.
32
 I suggested that Wolin offers a kind of antidote to the 
stable political agreement envisioned in John Rawls‘s notion of an 
―overlapping consensus.‖33 While I agree with Professor Bhagwat that 
some modicum of shared belief must hold us together, I argue that our 
politics reflects instability more than consensus.  
 
 
balance wheel metaphor that gained prominence in mid-twentieth century pluralism comes from 
DAVID BICKNELL TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC 
OPINION 502–06 (1951).  
 29. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1783–84 (2004) (describing the 
―First Amendment irrelevance‖ for ―that vast domain of criminal law that deals with conspiracy and 
criminal solicitation‖); see also KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 
(1989).  
 30. Of course, that possibility presumes that we can distinguish meaningfully between internal 
group deliberations and criminal conspiracies, an assumption that is certainly open to challenge in light 
of our past history. See INAZU, supra note 1, at 65–96. 
 31. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 1400. 
 32. INAZU, supra note 1, at 153–56 (discussing SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION 
(2004), and Sheldon S. Wolin, Democracy, Difference, and Re-Cognition, 21 POL. THEORY 464 
(1993)). 
 33. Id. at 153 (noting that ―the political theory of Sheldon Wolin . . . can be read as a 
counternarrative to the consensus arguments of Robert Dahl and John Rawls‖).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/8
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III. RELATIONALITY 
Professors Appleton and Bhagwat both argue that I have misconstrued 
the doctrinal development of intimate association. Professor Appleton 
suggests that I am wrong to argue that Eisenstadt v. Baird is a case about 
individual autonomy rather than association.
34
 She writes that ―issues of 
contraception necessarily and inherently implicate association‖ and that 
―the right to privacy—as defined by the Court in Eisenstadt—cannot be 
‗detached‘ from the right of association.‖35 Professor Bhagwat contends 
that the majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas asserts that ―the Due 
Process Clause protects liberty, in the form of sexual activity, precisely 
because that activity is a central aspect of an intimate personal bond.‖36 He 
suggests that ―[f]ar from abandoning intimate association, the Court‘s 
opinion [in Lawrence] seems to whole-heartedly endorse the concept, 
placing it at the very center of the Court‘s ‗privacy‘ jurisprudence.‖37  
I argue in Liberty‟s Refuge that the concept of intimate association 
originally rooted in associational privacy became resituated in a 
jurisprudence of individual autonomy.
38
 The most important development 
in that shift unfolded between Justice Douglas‘s opinion in Griswold v. 
Connecticut and Justice Brennan‘s opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird.39 I 
contend that Brennan‘s language in Eisenstadt ―shifted the focus away 
from Douglas‘s emphasis on the marriage relationship‖ in Griswold and 
―converted an understanding of associational freedom rooted in 
relationships between people to a right of individual autonomy.‖40 I also 
suggest that Lawrence, when viewed through the lens of a post-Eisenstadt 
jurisprudence, reads most naturally as a celebration of individual 
autonomy rather than relationality—it echoes Justice Kennedy‘s paean to 
―the right to define one‘s own concept of existence‖ more than Justice 
Douglas‘s appeal to ―an association that promotes a way of life.‖41  
 
 
 34. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 35. Appleton, supra note 5, at 1429. 
 36. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 1385–86 (discussing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566 
(2003)). 
 37. Id. 
 38. INAZU, supra note 1, at 128. 
 39. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 440–55; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480–86 (1965). 
 40. INAZU, supra note 1, at 128; see also id. at 125 (discussing Justice Douglas‘s original draft of 
Griswold that ―made scant reference to a right of privacy and rested . . . almost entirely on the First 
Amendment freedom of association‖).  
 41. Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), with Griswold, 381 U.S. 
at 486.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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To support my interpretation of Lawrence, I call attention to the two 
dissents in Bowers v. Hardwick, the 1986 decision that Lawrence 
overruled.
42
 Justice Blackmun‘s dissent argued that ―[t]he fact that 
individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate 
sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, 
that there may be many ‗right‘ ways of conducting those relationships, and 
that much of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an 
individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal 
bonds.‖43 Blackmun twice cited Kenneth Karst‘s seminal article ―The 
Freedom of Intimate Association.‖44 Justice Stevens‘s dissent emphasized 
―the individual‘s right to make certain unusually important decisions that 
will affect his own, or his family‘s, destiny.‖45 Lawrence relied squarely 
on the latter dissent: ―Justice Stevens‘ analysis, in our view, should have 
been controlling in Bowers and should control here.‖46 The Court‘s 
opinion scarcely mentioned Blackmun‘s dissent and never referenced the 
right of intimate association.
47
 
It may seem odd to spill this much ink over the meaning of Eisenstadt 
and Lawrence, two cases that have little to do doctrinally with either the 
right of assembly or the right of association. But the contested meaning of 
these cases points toward a larger debate about the nature, or at least the 
inflection, of our constitutional tradition. Consider H. Jefferson Powell‘s 
claim that ―Brennan‘s reading of Griswold turned Douglas‘s reasoning on 
its head‖ and signaled ―the identification of a radically individualistic 
liberalism as the moral content of American constitutionalism.‖48 If Powell 
is right, as I believe he is, then we need more than smoke signals from 
Lawrence if we are to recover the relational dimension of intimate 
association. Otherwise, as I argue in Liberty‟s Refuge, ―[i]ntimate 
association is reduced to intimate individualism.‖49 
 
 
 42. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). I also note that the briefs of the Lawrence 
petitioners repeatedly raised intimate association arguments. INAZU, supra note 1, at 237 n.40. 
 43. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 205, 211 (citing Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 
624 (1980)). I discuss Karst‘s article in INAZU, supra note 1, at 136–39. 
 45. Id. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem‘l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 
719–20 (7th Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976)). 
 46. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 47. Had Griswold‘s trajectory been left unaltered by Eisenstadt, I would venture a guess that we 
would still have Lawrence, but with a majority opinion tracking Justice Blackmun‘s Bowers dissent, 
not Justice Stevens‘s. 
 48. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A 
THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 176–77 (1993).  
 49. INAZU, supra note 1, at 140. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/8
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The preceding discussion also points to limitations inherent in the right 
of assembly and related questions about the nature and purpose of 
constitutional protections for groups. Professor Appleton is right to 
observe that ―even a robust freedom of assembly would be unlikely to 
protect‖ the ―intensely personal and gendered interests‖ at issue in 
Eisenstadt.
50
 While I believe that the interests in Eisenstadt are significant, 
they would not fall within the scope of the theory of assembly that I have 
articulated.  
IV. POWER 
I am grateful to Professor Appleton for naming the distinction between 
subordination and exclusion in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.
51
 I had 
not characterized the Jaycees‘s practices as subordinating (nor, for that 
matter, did the Court or any of the litigants), but Professor Appleton 
makes a good argument for construing the case in this way. And she 
correctly notes that my treatment of Roberts ―does not grapple with such 
matters of hierarchy and subordination.‖52  
Let me suggest, however, why Professor Appleton‘s observation does 
not alter my conclusion that the Jaycees probably ought to have prevailed 
in that case. In my view, we would still need to ask a series of questions 
that the Roberts majority never addressed, and the Jaycees‘s right of 
assembly should have been upheld without answers to those questions 
suggesting otherwise. Assuming that the Jaycees is a noncommercial 
group,
53
 I would want to know not simply that the group was 
subordinating women, but why the precise harms resulting from that 
subordination warranted the state‘s infringement upon the group and its 
members. What were the interests at stake, and why should they prevail 
over the constitutional rights afforded to the members of a private group? 
The Roberts opinion was bereft of contextual analysis: ―Nobody offered 
any explanation of why this remedy helped to eradicate gender 
 
 
 50. Appleton, supra note 5, at 1431. 
 51. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 52. Appleton, supra note 5, at 1433. I also agree with Professor Appleton‘s broader critique that I 
have ―overlook[ed] several opportunities to take gender into account.‖ Id. at 1434. 
 53. As Judge Arnold noted in the court below, ―[t]he Jaycees does not simply sell seats in some 
kind of personal-development classroom. Personal and business development, if they come, come not 
as products bought by members, but as by-products of activities in which members engage after they 
join the organization. These activities are variously social, civic, and ideological.‖ United States 
Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1569 (8th Cir. 1983), rev‟d, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 
U.S. 609 (1984). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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discrimination in these circumstances sufficient to trump the autonomy of 
this group.‖54 
Nor do I think that my assessment of Roberts leads me to adopt ―a clear 
divide between public and private‖ with respect to the Jaycees or an 
unqualified endorsement of Roberts or Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.
55
 In 
fact, I suggest that Roberts may well present ―a closer case‖ of a group 
whose overreaching private power might cause it to lose the protections of 
assembly.
56
 Similarly, I contend that the Boy Scouts displayed ―quasi-
public and quasi-monopolistic‖ characteristics and that ―of all the litigants 
to bring cases about group autonomy to the Supreme Court in the past 
thirty years . . . the Scouts are arguably the litigants least worthy of the 
constitutional protections of assembly.‖57  
These questions of private power are extremely complex, and I do not 
mean to oversimplify them or trivialize the harms that they present. As I 
wrote in Liberty‟s Refuge, those who are excluded by discriminatory 
groups: 
. . . are denied opportunities, privileges, and relationships they 
might otherwise have had. They may be harmed economically, 
socially, and psychologically. When groups exclude on the basis of 
characteristics like race, gender, or sexual orientation, the 
psychological harm of exclusion may also extend well beyond those 
who have actually sought acceptance to others who share their 
characteristics. For all of these reasons, there is much to be said for 
an antidiscrimination norm and the value of equality that underlies 
it.
58
 
 
 
 54. INAZU, supra note 1, at 16. 
 55. Appleton, supra note 5, at 1423 (citing Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000)). 
 56. INAZU, supra note 1, at 15–16. The problem is that the Justices in Roberts offered no 
information to let us know whether that was the case—they gave no explanation of the ways in which 
the Jaycees blurred the divide between public and private. Id. at 16.  
 57. Id. at 172, 251 n.36; see also id. at 251 n.37 (―Consider the Boy Scouts: Should the focus of 
the overreaching of private power be at the local or the national level? I find this to be a deeply 
complicated question, made even more problematic by the quasi-public nature of the Boy Scouts at the 
federal level. In some ways, the kind of power exerted by the Boy Scouts has been made possible by 
its national identity. On the other hand, the effects of this power will vary by locality, and local Scout 
troops might reflect the core understanding of assembly that I have articulated in this book.‖). 
 58. Id. at 175. I wrote these words in the context of a hypothetical ―missing dissent‖ in Roberts 
that I included at the end of Liberty‟s Refuge, but I have made the same point in John D. Inazu, The 
Unsettling „Well-Settled‟ Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149, 152 (2010). 
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In this respect, I think that Professor Appleton‘s ―asking the woman 
question‖ is extremely important.59 But she is not quite right to suggest 
that I ignore that question by failing to ―acknowledge the extensive 
feminist literature on the would-be public-private divide‖ or by offering 
―differing treatments of race-based and sex-based discrimination.‖60 In 
critiquing John Rawls‘s distinction between the ―basic structure‖ of 
society and ―private society,‖ I note that ―[f]eminist theorists have 
famously called attention to this ambiguity with respect to the family.‖61 
The feminist critique of Rawls is precisely the critique of the ―would-be 
public/private divide.‖ While I find the critique descriptively accurate, I 
disagree with its normative prescription, which would apply pressure to 
the public/private divide in order to regulate ―private society.‖62 I would 
instead acknowledge that Rawls‘s distinction is unworkable but argue that 
we should still protect the domain of private society from state 
interference. That does not ignore the feminist critique; it weighs the 
prescriptive outcomes differently.
63
 
With respect to the differences between race and gender that Professor 
Appleton ascribes to me, I make clear that while ―we might plausibly treat 
race differently when considering the boundaries of group autonomy . . . 
my proposal permits some racially discriminatory groups.‖64 My argument 
 
 
 59. Appleton, supra note 5, at 1423 (quoting Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990)). 
 60. Id. at 1426, 1431].  
 61. INAZU, supra note 1, at 158; see also id. at 245 n.12 (citing SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, 
GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989), and Ruth Abbey, Back Toward a Comprehensive Liberalism? 
Justice as Fairness, Gender, and Families, 35 POL. THEORY 19 (2007)). 
 62. See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, “„Mistresses of Their Own Destiny‟: Group Rights, Gender, 
and Realistic Rights of Exit, 112 ETHICS 205, 229–30 (2002) (asserting that the liberal state ―should 
not only not give special rights or exemptions to cultural and religious groups that discriminate against 
or oppress women‖ but ―should also enforce individual rights against such groups when the 
opportunity arises and encourage all groups within its borders to cease such practices‖). Jeff Spinner-
Halev notes that Okin‘s view represents ―[o]ne alternative to Rawlsian ambiguity,‖ which is ―simply to 
say that liberalism will tolerate religions [and other groups] as long as they are liberal.‖ Jeff Spinner-
Halev, Liberalism and Religion: Against Congruence, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 553, 561 (2008). 
 63. I should note that Liberty‟s Refuge did not sufficiently engage with the related and important 
question of exit rights, a concept that has perpetually confounded and divided political theorists. See, 
e.g., MINORITIES WITHIN MINORITIES: EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff 
Spinner-Halev eds., 2005); George Crowder, Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism, 35 POL. THEORY 
121, 128 (2007) (arguing that preserving the right of exit is inescapably ―a commitment to individual 
autonomy‖); Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEGAL THEORY 165 (1998). 
 64. INAZU, supra note 1, at 13–14. In this regard, I do not ―treat race-based discrimination 
differently from discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation.‖ Appleton, supra note 5, at 1433. 
Professor Appleton speculates that ―Professor Inazu probably finds racial classifications arbitrary and 
largely irrelevant to group identity but sees some ‗real differences‘ supporting classifications based on 
gender or sexual orientation.‖ Id. at 1433 n.84. But I do not think that racial classifications by a private 
group are necessarily ―arbitrary‖—it is at least conceptually plausible that the group would have an 
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is that ―treating race differently in all areas ultimately undercuts a vision of 
assembly that protects pluralism and dissent against state-enforced 
orthodoxy‖ and that ―[w]e cannot move from the premise that genuine 
pluralism matters to an effort to rid ourselves of the groups that we don‘t 
like.‖65  
The normative vision of assembly that I advocate risks instability, 
violence, racism, misogyny, and a parade of other evils. We should 
acknowledge those risks and take seriously their potential consequences. 
We may decide as a society that these are risks not worth taking. But we 
might also decide that the cost of pluralism means tolerating some forms 
of discrimination—and subordination—by private groups. The woman 
question should undoubtedly be part of the conversation, but it ought not 
presuppose an answer.
66
 
V. FUNDING 
I confess that I have few helpful insights to offer in response to 
Professor Appleton‘s astute observations about the connections between 
funding and rights. But let me make two brief comments. First, I think that 
Professor Appleton and I probably agree that the Supreme Court has fallen 
 
 
internally coherent and non-arbitrary reason for imposing a racial classification based upon its own 
norms and practices. 
 65. INAZU, supra note 1, at 14. Professor Appleton is correct that I do not challenge the holding 
of Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), the 1976 decision that required private schools to end 
racial segregation. Appleton, supra note 5, at 1431. It may be that the unique harms of racial 
discrimination in private schools (and even more precisely, the exclusion of African-Americans from 
all-white private schools) justify a categorical carve-out from the protections of assembly, but that 
carve-out could be narrower than a general prohibition on race-based discrimination in private groups. 
Alternatively, it may be that we would answer the constitutional question of an all-white private school 
differently in 2012 than we did in 1976. (I should also underscore the obvious but sometimes unspoken 
observation that the current state of our educational system is a stark reminder that the end of de jure 
segregation in public and private schools has not moved us toward a ―post-racial‖ society; nor do I 
believe that my proposal permitting some racially discriminatory private groups could be justified 
under a ―post-racial‖ jurisprudence. Cf. Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-
race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 972 (2010) (suggesting that ―the history, social reality, and 
life circumstances of people of color in this country do not support a broad adoption of the post-racial 
perspective within equal protection analysis‖).)  
 66. These questions are further complicated by contested meanings about discrimination and 
subordination. For example, limitations on the role of women in the leadership of the Catholic Church 
may be viewed as subordination by many outside (and inside) the Church, but there are plausible 
narratives from within Catholicism that reject the claim that gendered hierarchy in leadership 
necessarily equates to subordination. See, e.g., BENEDICT M. ASHLEY, JUSTICE IN THE CHURCH: 
GENDER AND PARTICIPATION (1996); JOYCE LITTLE, THE CHURCH AND THE CULTURE WAR: SECULAR 
ANARCHY OR SACRED ORDER (1995); Sara Butler, Embodied Ecclesiology: Church Teaching on the 
Priesthood, in WOMEN, SEX, AND THE CHURCH: A CASE FOR CATHOLIC TEACHING 143 (Erika 
Bachiochi ed., 2010).  
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short in explaining the contours of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, under which the denial of a generally available governmental 
benefit is considered a penalty for purposes of constitutional analysis.
67
 
The Court‘s analysis is particularly fuzzy when unconstitutional 
conditions intersect with government speech.
68
 As Joseph Blocher has 
argued, ―Although the government speech doctrine does not permit total 
bans on the expression of a private viewpoint, it does allow what had 
previously been thought forbidden: the burdening, even if not silencing, of 
private viewpoints because the government disagrees with them.‖69  
The government speech doctrine, at least in its current formulation, 
threatens longstanding First Amendment jurisprudence by enabling state 
actors to impose viewpoint-based limitations on generally available 
funding, use of meeting facilities, and other means of access. I have 
argued that the Court failed to address these concerns in Christian Legal 
Society v. Martinez,
70
 and Douglas Laycock has made similar arguments 
about Locke v. Davey.
71
 I disagree with the outcomes of both decisions, 
but I also find troubling the Court‘s inability or unwillingness to offer any 
helpful justifications for its approach to government speech and 
unconstitutional conditions in these cases. 
Second, if we are going to take seriously arguments that distinguish 
between government tolerating a dissenting group and government 
 
 
 67. Susan Frelich Appleton, Standards for Constitutional Review of Privacy-Invading Welfare 
Reforms: Distinguishing the Abortion-Funding Cases and Redeeming the Undue Burden Test, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 20 (1996) (noting that ―[t]he abortion-funding cases remain excruciatingly hard to 
reconcile with the long line of decisions invalidating ‗unconstitutional conditions‘‖); John D. Inazu, 
Justice Ginsburg and Religious Liberty, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1213, 1226–29, 1237–40 (2012). For 
discussions of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see generally Robert C. Post, Subsidized 
Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996), and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). 
 68. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (―[W]hen the government 
disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and 
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.‖); see also 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (noting that the Free Speech Clause ―does 
not regulate government speech‖); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass‘n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) 
(―[T]he Government‘s own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.‖). 
 69. Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 697 
(2011). Cf. Appleton, supra note 5, at 1427 (―Hastings, a public school operating as an arm of the 
state, made funding decisions that expressed its anti-discrimination values.‖). 
 70. Inazu, supra note 67, at 1237–40; see also Richard A. Epstein, Church and State at the 
Crossroads: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105, 110 (―[B]y ignoring 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, [Ginsburg] allowed Hastings far too much discretion in how it 
treated its student organizations.‖). 
 71. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarship, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: 
Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 246 (2004) (noting that 
Davey‘s ―deference to prophylactic rules of physical separation to avoid confronting an 
unconstitutional conditions issue has implications for all constitutional liberties‖).  
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subsidizing that group through generally available funds, then we ought to 
examine the logical and dramatic consequences of that reasoning for our 
current political arrangements. Professor Appleton suggests that my 
analysis of Martinez is a ―seamless move from private rights to public 
support‖ in which ―the case for freedom of assembly suffices to make the 
case for state subsidies and support.‖72 But I have not claimed anything 
more than disagreement with the denial of official recognition and its 
attendant benefits in Martinez.
73
 The monetary subsidy to the Christian 
Legal Society at Hastings College of the Law totaled $250 in travel funds, 
which were financed by vending machine sales commissions.
74
 While 
revenue from sodas and candy bars purchased by members of the Hastings 
community can certainly be construed as a subsidy, I am not sure that 
these facts commit me to a ―seamless move from private rights to public 
support.‖ And if they do, then we have only scratched the surface. 
Consider, for example, the federal tax exemption afforded charitable 
organizations, which the Supreme Court has equated to a government 
subsidy.
75
 How does tax-exempt status relate to the kinds of 
antidiscrimination norms underlying Martinez? Cases like Bob Jones v. 
United States
76
 and Grove City College v. Bell
77
 seem to suggest that 
 
 
 72. Appleton, supra note 5, at 1426, 1427. 
 73. INAZU, supra note 1, at 5, 149. 
 74. Joint Stipulation of Facts for Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment ¶ 37, Christian Legal 
Soc‘y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371), 2010 WL 372139, at *227 [hereinafter Joint 
Stipulation] (―In early September 2004, Ms. Haddad and Mr. Fong applied to the Office of Student 
Services for travel funds to travel to CLS-National‘s annual conference. On or about September 9, 
2004, Ms. Chapman informed Ms. Haddad via email that the Office of Student Services had set aside 
$250.00 in travel funds to cover Ms. Haddad and Mr. Fong‘s expenses associated with attending the 
conference.‖). Travel funds came from vending machine sales commissions. Id. ¶ 9 n.2. The society 
was ineligible for other funding because it was never approved as a registered student organization, id. 
¶ 9(f), and nothing in the record indicates that the society planned on requesting additional funding. It 
is, of course, possible to construe the prorated costs of the use of facilities for Bible studies as a kind of 
monetary subsidy, but as Professor Appleton intimates, this kind of line drawing quickly becomes 
difficult to sustain. Appleton, supra note 5, at 1427 n.33 (―[E]ven if the group meets exclusively in 
private homes, it will benefit from some state services, such as public utilities and police protection.‖). 
 75. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (organizations eligible for tax-exempt status include 
―[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes‖). For the 
connection between exemption and subsidy, see, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 
U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (―A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization 
of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income.‖); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 
14 (1989) (―Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing 
them to become indirect and vicarious donors.‖) (internal quotations omitted). See also Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
379 (1998). 
 76. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Bob Jones University and 
Goldsboro Christian Schools (the petitioner in a consolidated case) maintained racially discriminatory 
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private schools—even religious ones—must accept funding constraints 
arising from federal antidiscrimination law or policy. These private 
institutions are given a choice: comply with the antidiscrimination 
condition or walk away from the money. But it is difficult to see how the 
logic of Bob Jones and Grove City does not reach all tax-exempt 
organizations.  
Professor Appleton reasonably asks ―where noninterference ends and 
state support begins.‖78 But even if we were able to establish a bright-line 
rule for direct funding, the line between noninterference and state support 
is arguably crossed when a group of students is denied access to an 
expressive forum created by a state-run institution of higher learning.
79
 
Here the specific details of Martinez are again important to highlight. In 
addition to withholding modest funding and the use of its logo, Hastings 
also denied the Christian Legal Society the opportunity to send mass e-
mails to the student body, to participate in the annual student organizations 
fair, and to reserve meeting spaces on campus.
80
 These activities are not 
sponsorship or state support.
81
 They are means of participation in the free 
 
 
admissions policies, which led the Internal Revenue Service to withdraw their tax-exempt status on 
public policy grounds. The schools lost at the Supreme Court 8–1. Id. at 579–81, 583.  
 77. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). Grove City had refused to sign a Title IX 
compliance document from the Department of Education that prohibited ―discrimination under any 
education program or activity for which [it] receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance.‖ Id. 
at 560. One of the college‘s arguments was that the application of the Title IX restrictions violated its 
―First Amendment rights to academic freedom and association.‖ Brief for Petitioner, Grove City 
College v. Bell at *80, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (No. 82-792), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 292. The 
Court had little trouble concluding that Title IX‘s restrictions trumped Grove City‘s First Amendment 
rights, noting that ―Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal 
financial assistance that education institutions are not obligated to accept.‖ Grove City College, 465 
U.S. at 575. 
 78. Appleton, supra note 5, at 1427 n.33.  
 79. Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (―The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion 
or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction. These principles provide the 
framework forbidding the State to exercise viewpoint discrimination, even when the limited public 
forum is one of its own creation.‖) (internal citation omitted). 
 80. Christian Legal Soc‘y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL 
997217, at *172 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Christian Legal Soc‘y 
Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Newton, (No. 08-1371) (S. Ct. May 5, 2009); see also Joint Stipulation, 
supra note 74, ¶ 62 (―Hastings‘ General Counsel also informed CLS that while it was free to use 
chalkboards and generally available bulletin boards on the campus to announce its events, CLS did not 
have permission to use the Student Information Center for distribution of organization materials, nor 
the Hastings Weekly or [the law school‘s student] weekly emails to make announcements.‖). 
 81. See Joint Stipulation, supra note 74, ¶ 13 (―Among other things, the Policies and Regulations 
provide that Hastings and the University of California ‗neither sponsor nor endorse‘ registered student 
organizations. Registered student organizations are required to enter into a license agreement in order 
to use Hastings‘ name and logos, which provides that the organization ‗will inform its members and 
include in all its written materials that [Hastings] does not sponsor the organization nor its activities 
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exchange of ideas.
82
 As the Supreme Court noted in an earlier case:  
If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus 
community in which new students enter on a regular basis, it must 
possess the means of communicating with these students. Moreover, 
the organization‘s ability to participate in the intellectual give and 
take of campus debate, and to pursue its stated purposes, is limited 
by the denial of access to the customary media for communicating 
with the administration, faculty members, and other students. Such 
impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.
83
 
VI. COMMERCIALITY 
While Professors Bhagwat and Appleton both challenge the potential 
breadth of assembly, Professor Vischer suggests that I may not have gone 
far enough. Specifically, Professor Vischer questions my proposed line 
drawing between commercial and noncommercial groups. As he rightly 
notes, many commercial groups manifest the values that I have located in 
the right of assembly: ―Whether it‘s a for-profit company taking a stand on 
animal testing, climate change, same-sex partner benefits, refusals to stock 
the morning after pill, or countless other morally contested issues, there is 
regularly a connection between corporate practices and an underlying 
vision, attitude, or value.‖84 These observations expand upon my critique 
of Justice O‘Connor‘s binary distinction between ―commercial‖ and 
―expressive‖ groups.85 I have argued that Justice O‘Connor misses the 
expressiveness in many commercial groups; Professor Vischer deepens the 
critique by pointing out that commercial groups can not only be expressive 
but also manifest ―vision, attitude, or value.‖ 
 
 
and that [Hastings] assumes no legal responsibility for the organization, its officers or members, or any 
of its activities.‘‖) (citations omitted).  
 82. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840 (―[S]tudent life in its many dimensions includes the 
necessity of wide-ranging speech and inquiry and that student expression is an integral part of the 
University‘s educational mission.‖); id. at 835 (noting that universities have a ―background and 
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition‖); 
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (―The college classroom with its surrounding environs is 
peculiarly ‗the marketplace of ideas.‘‖).  
 83. Healy, 408 U.S. at 181–82.  
 84. Vischer, supra note 5, at 1414. But cf. Bhagwat, supra note 10, at 1000 (―In contrast to the 
wide range of broadly democratic associations that deserve First Amendment protection, certain 
associations whose primary goals are immaterial to democracy do not. The most obvious are 
commercial associations, including for-profit corporations and other commercial entities such as 
limited and professional partnerships, whose primary goal is to make money.‖).  
 85. INAZU, supra note 1, at 135 (critiquing Justice O‘Connor‘s Roberts concurrence). 
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I welcome Professor Vischer‘s more charitable characterization of 
commercial groups, and he is right to suggest that I have failed to provide 
a principled reason for excluding commercial groups from the protections 
of assembly. I do not think that one exists. Professor Vischer‘s 
clarifications reinforce the political nature of my proposed line drawing 
between commercial and noncommercial groups. I wrote in Liberty‟s 
Refuge that: 
[O]ur constitutional, social, and economic history offers broad 
support for [distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial 
groups] today—few people endorse a general right of a commercial 
entity to discriminate in the hiring of its employees or in the 
customers its serves. Employment law presumes that a commercial 
entity has no right to discriminate unless it can justify that the 
discrimination is warranted as a ―bona fide occupational 
qualification.‖ Discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or sexual 
orientation by commercial groups against customers is even less 
common. These concessions to antidiscrimination norms in the 
commercial sector reflect political compromises that reorient but do 
not eliminate the underlying values clash between equality and 
autonomy. Their political salience and moral force depends in some 
ways upon maintaining a workable distinction between commercial 
and noncommercial.
86
 
Professor Vischer has elsewhere suggested reasons against drawing such a 
line: 
[W]here the marketplace provision of certain goods and services is 
subject to a society-wide battle over moral norms, allowing the 
contest to proceed may be more conducive to a healthy and engaged 
public life than the current inclination to enshrine legally one set of 
moral norms and negate the others. State power is not marginalized 
in the moral marketplace, but it is constrained, as it is devoted to 
ensuring a well-functioning market, not to eviscerating the market 
through the top-down imposition of particular moral norms.
87
 
 
 
 86. INAZU, supra note 1, at 167. 
 87. ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE 
BETWEEN PERSON AND STATE 5 (2010). Professor Vischer‘s comments on Liberty‟s Refuge highlight a 
particularly salient example of these tensions: the mandate on contraception coverage issued by the 
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119. Vischer, supra note 5, at 1406. 
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These arguments are not implausible, and they reflect an ongoing 
discussion as to ―whether market institutions should be included in the 
concept of civil society.‖88 But I am skeptical that a proposal to strengthen 
group autonomy would gain much traction without drawing this kind of 
line. As Professor Vischer himself notes, ―generally ‗commercial entities 
are not included within the purview of civil society.‘‖89  
This understanding of civil society does not mean that commercial 
groups will be left unprotected in all settings. Indeed, Professor Vischer‘s 
own work powerfully argues that the ―relational dimension of conscience‖ 
may provide an important theoretical anchor for extending statutory 
protections to certain groups through the political process.
90
 In these 
circumstances, state and local governments may have to decide whether to 
accept the benefits of those groups at the cost of affording them greater 
autonomy.
91
 
On the other hand, even excluding commercial entities will not fully 
account for shifting dynamics of public and private power.
92
 This shifting 
 
 
 88. Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post, Introduction, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 4 
(Robert C. Post & Nancy L. Rosenblum eds., 2002). 
 89. VISCHER, supra note 87, at 166 (quoting Miriam Galston, Civic Renewal and the Regulation 
of Nonprofits, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y, 289, 294 (2004)). Jürgen Habermas suggests that ―the 
associations of a civil society [are] quite distinct from both state and economy alike.‖ JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY 301 (William Rehg trans., 1996); see id. at 366–67 (―[Civil society‘s] institutional core 
comprises those nongovernmental and noneconomic connections and voluntary associations that 
anchor the communication structures of the public sphere in the society component of the lifeworld. 
Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, 
and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and 
transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a 
network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general 
interest inside the framework of organized public spheres.‖). 
 90. See VISCHER, supra note 87, at 43 (―Most nonreligious forms of conscience lack 
constitutional protection unless they can find a foothold in substantive due process, free speech, or the 
right of association. What we are left with, then, is a legal framework that leaves the liberty of 
conscience primarily to the legislative process.‖); see also id. at 306 (―[C]onscience‘s vitality depends 
on more than the identification and application of particular constitutional rights. Much of the 
responsibility for conscience falls on political actors.‖). 
 91. Cf. Vischer, supra note 5, at 1416 (―To the extent that Inazu is limiting the right of assembly 
to non-commercial enterprises, it‘s not entirely clear why monopolistic status is important to the 
inquiry unless he has in mind charitable organizations that may be the only provider of key social 
services in a given community. Even in that context, though, the state needs to proceed carefully, as 
the alternative to a provider who refuses to provide all the services deemed important by the state may 
be no provider at all.‖). 
 92. INAZU, supra note 1, at 17–18. Cf. Rosenblum & Post, supra note 88, at 2 (―To say that the 
boundary between civil society and government is located differently in diverse political regimes and 
that its purposes are justified differently by various political, moral, and religious theories is just the 
beginning. Within any given state, the boundary is shifting in practice; it responds to the ongoing 
contingencies of political experience.‖). 
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of boundaries is one of the reasons that I have proposed an anti-
monopolistic test on the backend of an assembly analysis. As I wrote in 
Liberty‟s Refuge: 
Sometimes, but rarely, the power exerted by peaceable, 
noncommercial assemblies will overreach to such an extent that the 
right would give way to the interests of the state. . . . When courts 
are unable to offer a convincing account of this overreaching of 
private power—supported with factual rigor rather than aspirational 
values—they should defer to the values of assembly.93 
As the above language makes clear, the anti-monopolistic test is set 
intentionally high—it will capture few groups. As a consequence, the 
theory of assembly that I am advocating would allow private 
noncommercial groups to exert forms of power that many people would 
find oppressive or unjust. As Professor Bhagwat rightly notes, ―power 
does not require monopoly.‖94  
This realm of power short of monopoly is where I suspect the divergent 
normative intuitions of Professors Bhagwat and Appleton on the one hand, 
and Professor Vischer and myself on the other, are most apparent. 
Professor Bhagwat nicely frames the issue: 
What if we knew that access to a group, say, the Jaycees, was 
important in a particular community in building business contacts? 
Or a similar situation existed with a particular, all-White or all-
Christian country club? To call such situations ―monopolistic‖ 
strikes me as doing injury to language, but exclusion from such 
institutions matters in very pragmatic ways for the excluded. In 
those sorts of situations, are we truly comfortable saying that the 
balance must favor the exclusionary group‘s assembly rights? The 
fact is that such groups . . . subvert the social order in meaningful 
ways by undermining the equality and inclusion norms which 
participatory democracy is built upon. Clearly, some challenges to 
social norms by exclusionary groups must be protected, which is 
why the Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi Party retain their 
constitutional protection despite their abhorrent and exclusionary 
beliefs, but when the group at issue is not a triviality, and its 
 
 
 93. INAZU, supra note 1, at 172. 
 94. Bhagwat, supra note 5, at 1398. 
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exclusionary actions start to bite, the proper solution is no longer 
self-evident.
95
 
I agree with everything that Professor Bhagwat writes in this passage. But 
I suggest that honoring meaningful dissent from the norms of the state 
means that we must be especially vigilant to extend the protections of 
assembly ―when the group at issue is not a triviality.‖ The hard questions 
begin when speech and assembly start to matter. It costs us little to protect 
deeply offensive but politically irrelevant groups like the Westboro 
Baptists.
96
 We may face more difficult challenges with the Tea Party, the 
Occupy Movement, and the groups they inspire.
97
  
VII. LIBERTY‘S FUTURE 
The diagnostic, historical, and normative arguments in Liberty‟s Refuge 
are interrelated: the normative claim is strengthened by the weight of 
history and the weaknesses of the current doctrine. But even if I am right 
on the history and doctrine, the normative argument must still attract some 
salience in order to be plausible under the kind of constitutional reasoning 
that underlies today‘s First Amendment jurisprudence. The normative 
argument for greater group autonomy is political insofar as the values 
clash it invokes cannot be fully reconciled—we will ultimately privilege 
either the state or the non-state group.
98
  
But while our resolution of this incommensurability is at some level 
political, the means by which we resolve it are not irrelevant—
constitutional theory, history, and argument still matter. The significance 
of this last point was highlighted in an exchange that I had with my 
colleague, Professor Brian Tamanaha, during the discussion at which these 
papers were presented. Here is a portion of that exchange: 
 
 
 95. Id.  
 96. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 97. For some preliminary connections between my arguments for assembly and these 
movements, see Jeremy Kessler, The Closing of the Public Square, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 12, 2012, 
12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/book/review/the-closing-the-public-square-john-inazu-timothy-zick. 
See also Todd Gitlin, Is Freedom of Assembly a Dead Letter, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 7, 2012, 
5:05 PM), http://chronicle.com/blogs/brainstorm/is-freedom-of-assembly-a-dead-letter/46538. 
 98. One could argue a third option of privileging the individual (or a dissenting faction) within 
the group. See, e.g., Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise, 47 B.C. L. REV. 275 
(2006); Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001). But at least with respect to 
antidiscrimination norms applied to illiberal groups, the individual (or dissenting faction) aligns with 
the state.  
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Professor Tamanaha: What‘s interesting to me is the tension 
between the Constitution as a legal document and the nature of the 
analysis that dominates in the discussion, which is normative 
analysis. The problem is that if we are going to evaluate the 
Constitution from a normative standpoint and then come up with a 
legal hook that gets us there, once we bring the law in, the law 
carries its own form of analysis. Part of that analysis is precisely 
textual, the text has some sense of meaning, and that meaning turns 
us to the historical context, and so it starts pushing back against 
you. I want to know which of these is compelling the analysis. Are 
we resurrecting assembly because it‘s in the Constitution? Had 
assembly not led to the normative outcomes that you are interested 
in achieving, would you then go down a different path? And I guess 
a part of the reason I‘m raising this is that constitutional law 
actually carries the name ―law.‖ How does the invocation of some 
form of legal integrity affect the analysis? I‘m really struck by how 
much preferred normative outcome drives the analysis to the point 
where it leads to a kind of suspicion that you‘re couching it in legal 
analysis and then shaping it whatever way you can to make sure that 
you‘re producing the normative outcomes you want. How much 
does the fact that this is a constitution with the word ―assembly‖ in 
it really matter in terms of the bottom line here?  
 Professor Inazu: It matters to the degree that it is a persuasive 
and salient part of the interpretative tradition that we inherit and 
carry forward. I actually think one of the most helpful forms of 
constitutional interpretation may turn out to be related to the 
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre‘s understanding of tradition-
dependent argument. I think that approach is going to bring in the 
kitchen sink to the analysis, and that will include text, history, and 
precedent, and our values as we perceive them today.  
 Professor Tamanaha: But it seems to me that whether or not I 
like your assembly analysis depends upon whether or not I am 
convinced by your normative vision and if that‘s the case, then that 
should be what this is all about, because otherwise I‘d say, ―Okay, 
assembly‘s in the Constitution, but who cares?‖ So what I‘m saying 
is all the action now has to be about the normative vision, not the 
extent that you tack back to the word being in the Constitution. 
 Professor Inazu: I‘m not sure that‘s right. There are people who 
agree with my normative commitments, and they don‘t need any 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1456 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:1435 
 
 
 
 
convincing. And there are people who hold views so antithetical to 
my normative commitments that they‘re never going to be 
persuaded. I‘m actually interested in the people in the middle, and 
trying to figure out whether there is something in the law that holds 
us all together. There are normative arguments that frame the 
salience and the persuasiveness of the account, but it‘s not all 
normativity. If there is law going forward, it includes the structures 
of the law. So I don‘t think it‘s a hook to say that we should look at 
text and cases.
99
  
Professor Tamanaha and I agree that the normative dimensions of 
constitutional law do not unfold in a vacuum. The Constitution is a legal 
text. Its existence and our practice of legal interpretation constrain the laws 
that govern us today. What is true for the whole is true of its parts, 
including ―the right of the people peaceably to assemble.‖ We give 
meaning to assembly through history, politics, and normativity, but also, 
and indispensably, law. That is one of the aspirations of Liberty‟s Refuge, 
and I am deeply grateful to the participants in this discussion for pushing 
us further in that direction. 
 
 
 99. See Engaging Liberty‘s Refuge at 1:23:02 (Mar. 2, 2012), available at http://mediasite.law 
.wustl.edu/Mediasite/Viewer/?peid=ab40c332eb734b5f810b1012222dacce. I have edited the transcript 
for clarity (e.g., removing verbal tics, clarifying pronouns, and omitting comments not directly 
relevant to the focus of the exchange).  
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